The Business of Identity

by Jack Yan

Companies spend anywhere between a few thousand and a few million dollars on identity. To the small enterprise, identity is the development of a letterhead and a business card. To the large multinational, identity's most evident manifestation may be on the tails of a fleet of aircraft. Identity can even determine the fate of nations, when it comes to election campaigns.

Yet there seem to be two major problems.

Few know what identity is, and fewer still know whether having one benefits business performance.

And there is a lot of talk about 'branding'. Is it the solution to all corporate marketing problems, or just a pretender to the crown?

In late 1996, I vowed to find out and *Corporate Identity: Its Effects on Business Performance* became the subject and title of my master's thesis. Two-and-a-half years later, the thesis is completed.

Understanding identity

At a personal level, identity is instinctively important. We know that if we have one, we are a better person. Our personal identity identifies us through the things we do: whether we keep our word, how we treat our friends, what clubs we belong to. It is made up of all the interactions we have with other people.

Then do we have a brand? On the farm, the brand identifies one farmer's cow from another's. It is outward. It doesn't tell us much about the personality of the cow or whether it is easy-going.

For a person, then, a brand must also be something which helps others seek us, and is outwardly directed. Since people are not literally branded, it is whether we wear a suit or what car we drive. The branding of a business executive and the branding of a hippie is to some extent determined by dress. Or a blind date may identify us by a flower we wear. It doesn't necessarily attest to our identity, i.e. who we really are inside, but it may give some indication as to what someone contacting us might expect. Branding is why we dress up—to make a positive first impression to someone meeting us.



Identity and branding were the buzzwords of the 1990s. One survey showed that British marketing managers rated identity more highly than advertising.
Yet, the terms are still being confused, and no one knows whether there is even any benefit to the bottom line as a result of identity or branding.
Until now.

These concepts can be taken to an organizational level. In 1995, my colleague Wally Olins of Wolff Olins, who arguably knows more about the topic than anyone else, wrote that identity 'is the explicit management of all the ways in which the organization presents itself through experiences and perceptions to all of its audiences.' These audiences include, most importantly, internal ones, e.g. staff.

'Corporate branding' is 'the corporation or part of the corporation treated as a brand and aimed at the customer,' and is inherently external. When most people talk about branding, they usually refer to it at this corporate, or organizational level. They also, for the most part, refer to it as an outward exercise. A brand-building exercise is usually targeted at consumers and not internal staff.

There is some logic to the internal–external distinction when it comes to organizations.

For a single person, identity is down to one's free will and personal philosophy. If a company is to have an identity, a lot of people have a part to play. Everyone has to act according to the philosophy of the company. But we all have free wills, so it becomes a matter of educating these individuals so they will exercise their free wills in a way that suits that philosophy—and, ultimately, helps their own welfare. People need to be taught, rather than ordered, in the successful firm.

If 50 per cent of the staff at a company are good-natured, and the remainder are ill-mannered, then the experiences and perceptions that company's audiences gain will be confused. Some will say the company is excellent. Others will say it is awful. If our instincts are right, then bad news spreads more quickly, so that a company risks having a reputation for rudeness, even when half of its team have behaved themselves.

Therefore, for an organization, everyone who works for it internally must have a clear idea of what the company stands for, and how to exhibit that to audiences. It must start from the top—the chairman, CEO, COO and directors, who determine the *raison d'être* of the



organization—and be communicated to the internal audiences first. These internal audiences, too, must have good experiences and perceptions of its management, otherwise any directive is likely to be ignored. Thus, as Olins once noted, there is a 'corporate personality' that is the essence, or the soul, of the organization. Identity is its manifestation.

Sandra Fekete at Fekete + Company of Columbus, Ohio, went so far as to develop personality types, based on psychological typologies, for organizations.

Once the internal audiences understand the identity, they can act accordingly to create the positive experiences and perceptions to external audiences. Its brand may be created along the same lines, to communicate to these external groups socially and, although I did not discuss it, semiotically.

Theoretically, these positive experiences and perceptions form a certain image. They may act as reasons to purchase from or work with the organization, and logically, this should lead to improved business performance.

So we have a five-stage plan for identity: vision; research; exposition (or exposure) both internally and externally (the latter being the task of 'branding'); image (resulting from the above); and business performance.

Commencing the study

THE THEORY suggests identity must start at the top. When creating the methodology, I went to the top.

Wally Olins, who founded identity consultancy Wolff Olins, which has brought us the identities for Orange, Prudential, NatWest and P&O, made one of the biggest contributions to this study, with his advice and experience.

His *New Guide to Identity* formed the basis of the methodology. This no-nonsense guide to identity is based on Wally's unequalled experience in the discipline. It also clarified the definitions which many identity and branding experts apply inconsistently. Examples of Wally's theories could be found in practice in his other books *International Corporate Identity 1* and *Corporate Identity*.

A literature review which included most of the last 50 years of academic inquiry into identity was next, taking up most of 1997. There were a number of landmark pieces, from Walter Margulies in the *Harvard Business Review*, Dr Sheril Kennedy's study into corporate image, and the very popular writings on branding by David Aaker, all of which were combined into the thesis.

At this point, the thesis still suffered from being in a vacuum. How could identity link to business performance?

I was fortunate to have studied marketing prior to the thesis and became familiar with the market orientation models, which successfully linked orientation with the bottom line. Studies by British academics Cadogan and Diamantopoulos and, in New Zealand, by Thirkell and Dau, provided the solution. I was doubly fortunate to have had Prof Peter Thirkell himself supervise the thesis at Victoria University, Wellington.

These marketing orientation models essentially say that there are antecedents to making an organization truly marketing oriented. It must have: management commitment; facilitative leadership; and a lack of interdepartmental conflict. They affect the quality of: coordination; intelligence generation; intelligence dissemination; and business responsiveness. The market orientation models have been tested time and time again by academics to suggest that one need not take a grain of salt with them.

It isn't hard to see that these have parallels in identity. The coordinating mechanism becomes the vision. Intelligence generation has a parallel in research, dissemination in exposing the identity to internal staff and then externally.

Responsiveness, defined generally as how active or passive the organization is, has parallels with how actively the organization manages its image. Both are consequences of the earlier stages. Additionally, both are façades that the external audience initially perceives. While there are some differences, there were enough similarities to create a model combining identity theory, identity practice and business performance.

How it all works

RATHER than take you through the earlier model used as the basis for the thesis, shown at right is the final diagram which connects each identity stage to business performance.

An initial 84 firms were contacted, with 11 responding. Finding them was difficult and here I was aided by Serena Joe and Tim Fowler of the Wellington Regional Chamber of Commerce, and Sarah Scarlett of the Sales and Marketing Executives' Wellington chapter.

The 11 were from a wide variety of industries, as is expected given the two principal resources. Others were found from sources such as personal contacts, including two high-level executive members of a bank to whom I am very grateful, and cold-calling. As a CEO I suddenly gained a great deal of respect for those on my staff who had to contact strangers on a daily basis. It was humbling at the least and frustrating at the worst.

The 11 were used for an initial analysis, and six were studied in depth. The six were selected carefully based on an initial evaluation of market share, profitability and sales so as to provide the study with as great a scope as possible. I also tried to keep the final six very diverse.

While there were only 24 subjects from the six, the use of a variety of unrelated organizations, questionnaires, interviews and other sources painted comprehensive pictures to show that there is a connection between a professionally executed identity programme and the bottom line.

The firms

SIX COMPANIES were selected based on the initial evaluation. The idea was to choose two good identities ('A' firms), two average ones ('B'), and two poor ones ('C'). I had information pertaining to market share, demand and profitability, and also some initial data on how well articulated the vision was, how the staff were reached, and whether there was an identity programme in place (without defining identity at this point).

A scientific services' company had growing sales with rising market share, and it was considered A1, based on the score I assigned them in the analysis. A2 was a downstream retailer—for reasons known to that company it would be unwise to be any more specific—which was also experiencing good growth and profitability.

B1 was an insurer where market share was not important and therefore, it was dropping. However, there were indications that some of the "must-dos" of identity were done. B2, an arts organization, faced rising share and sales, while its marketing research was nearly unequalled.

C1 was in security and the indicators painted a bleak picture. C2, a publisher, had rising market share but numerous concerns.



As the research unfolded, there appeared to be certain problems at A1 which forced its relabelling as CO. These are discussed below. Despite that company's kindness, academic objectivity won the day.

I cannot reveal the identities of these participants and the information they shared with me was sensitive, but I am particularly grateful to the marketing manager of B2, the generosity of the general managers of CO and B1, and the brands' manager of A2. These four individuals went further than most.

By the book: A2

A2 WAS EXEMPLARY. This downstream retailer, owned by American interests, was allowed to develop an Asia-Pacific identity. Although there was no management-approved time to work on this, A2 had a clear vision, a true cross-functional working group, customer surveys and organization-wide consistency. The culture appeared to be excellent. Even the legal department knew much about the identity programme. All were positive signs which suggested not only competence in the identity and branding programmes, but market orientation as well.

Research took place throughout A2. A group from the communications' department took 18 months before initiatives were taken to introduce the identity internally. Staff were surveyed not only on their impressions, but on how the identity might make its appearance. As a result of the many functions being involved, findings not only made it to the branding stage, but also to drive training programmes and internal communications. Formal channels such as the internal publication were used to keep everyone informed.

External research was also conducted, so the working group came to understand the gaps in perceptions between internal and external audiences, and what work was needed so all would hold the desired perceptions.

A2 was not faultless in its inquiry. It did not reconcile the research with its strategy, nor was the industry examined with as much depth. Consequently, A2's identity became focused on its past and present: 'who we were, rather than who we wanted to be,' in the words of one internal respondent. However, the group had identified what made it different: its attitude. While its 1999 campaign, running as I write, is different in look and feel to what was being shown in 1998, this central idea remains.

The internal launch was not onerous, as employees were already prepared thanks to the updates. Top management was heavily involved and merchandise such as screensavers and mousepads were given to staff. Training and other programmes using the new identity were under way.

Branding began afterwards. A2 had planted representatives from its advertising agency within, so they could absorb the culture.

The image is highly positive. There is much evidence to suggest A2 has succeeded, and it has climbed the ranks in external audience perception.

Post-launch, the research contin-



ued, continually feeding back into how marketing can be fine-tuned. Employees are asked in exercises, 'If you bumped into [A2] in a dark alley, how would you recognize it?' and 'How would you recognize service at [A2] that would make it different from service anywhere else?'

There are worries. The vision statement sounds bland and the slogan is carrying A2's entire philosophy. However, A2 showed that its method could work, as would be discovered in the cross-case analysis.

B1 Case B1: the power of one

B1 INSURES households and purposely has a strategy to focus on the home market, at the expense of losing its business one. Neither market share nor profitability were important. Unusually, B1 is very compact, with its operations centred in Wellington. The identity planning was left up to its general manager.

The general manager arrived to oversee B1's restructuring. He felt that at the time, half of his staff was employed to run an office and did not really understand the company's purpose. The new identity came as a result of changing internal perceptions and equip B1 for its new structure.

The research consisted of informal discussions and some formal surveys, but these were focused on the past and present. They were run by the general manager, although with his day-to-day duties, the sessions were less intensive than at A2.

Staff members were asked to contribute to the vision statement. They had the opportunity to question the findings, but no opportunity to undertake their own research. They were updated on the identity's progress at staff meetings and became enthusiastic to promote the company.

While a new vision statement was created, it sounded trite but could not belong to any other company.

Findings did see that certain elements remained the same. The symbol did not change because it was felt that the equity was worth preserving, although it was applied differently, with new accompanying typefaces.

The immediate aim of boosting staff awareness and pride was met. Those in contact with B1 also claimed improvements in dealings. One interviewee said that there was now 'an emphasis on doing things well. There is nothing I've seen that contradicts that.' This was typical of the industry interviewees researched.

However, even industry audiences were not wholly clear on where B1 stood, particularly its future. To the homeowner, B1 was distant, although impressions were not completely negative. The general manager understood this, and steps were being made at the time of the study to remedy this.

With B1's unique strategy, the company can only be judged on reputation, service quality and image. In these respects B1 is only average: positive impressions were gained by industry audiences but not by its clients. There was evidence that its branding campaign, released at the time of the study, had some positive effects amongst homeowner audiences.

B2 Case B2: reversing the downward trend

ARTS' ORGANIZATIONS have not found the 1990s easy-going. Funding, competition from other entertainment forms, and uncertainty over discretionary income have not helped. However, B2 was particularly fortunate to have a marketing manager who steered it to increasing sales (which were 'handsomely' over projections)—at a time when industry performance was faltering. She was also the only marketing manager interviewed who saw the distinction between identity and branding.

One of her first tasks at B2 was to undertake in-depth marketing research, which took two years. She had a cross-functional working group which focused on internal and external audiences. She was new to the industry and treated the research as her own initiation, describing the process as 'an emotional journey.' Long-term strategic information was shared throughout the group. Her forward planning even looks at the consumer of the 2040s and 2050s.

The research challenged assumptions about B2's positioning, its customers, and the benefits they sought.

Internally, her colleagues were kept informed of every step of the research, so when the official launch came, it confirmed what they already knew. They saved on the cost of a huge presentation.

Externally, the marketing manager had research to prove that the branding exercise was successful. Tracking studies continued.

However, not all was well. The marketing manager admitted that working conditions were not ideal and her staff was at 'breaking point' at times, even if the culture had improved.

While external audiences felt its work was faultless, they were not convinced about its image. B2 had suffered from negative press in the past. One organization which had worked with B2 claimed there was 'prima donna behaviour' amongst artists, and there were compromises over 'their ability to deliver.'

One audience member who had been involved with B2 over four decades was more complimentary, saying the atmosphere was far more open and the management was very accommodating.

At this point in the research, there seems to be conflict. Here is B2, a company which had done many things by the book, and had rising sales to support its actions, but which suffered from some negative perceptions. How could it, according to the theory, have box-office receipts well above projections? As the analysis below finds, the theory still stands and B2 does not have to worry.

C0 Risky diversifications

C0 HAD been diversifying over the last few years. There was evidence the strategy was sound: 30 per cent of its work, all under the same banner, was now outside its core area. The research was in great depth. But there were areas following the research which saw this scientific services' company grouped with the Cs.

First, C0 was burdened with an unimaginative vision statement. Then, with the vision and strategy set, the information officer, who had not played a part in the earlier stages, was asked to implement the identity, almost as an afterthought. Nonetheless, her loyalty saw this accomplished with aplomb, but it seemed enthusiasm might not be enough.

The designer, who had worked with C0 before, came up with proposals which captured the new strategy. This was shown to C0 staff at head office, but those in outlying offices did not participate. Further, this was the only time C0 staff (as distinct from management) ever got a chance to participate in the identity process.

It was, then, no surprise to discover confusion over C0's name. Outlying offices did not fully understand the implications of the new identity and there were some who, after two years, introduced themselves using C0's old name. Consistency was poor: C0 lacked a formal corporate identity manual, and even colours and typefaces changed between issues of its newsletters—although this had been remedied to some extent when I returned there in 1999, after the study.

The new businesses failed to operate with the success of C0's core ones. One new business was perceived to be an 'appendage' and while the interviewee thought highly of C0's head office, had far less complimentary comments about its front-line employees working elsewhere. He intends to terminate the contract when it comes up for renewal.

However, a second core-industry client was far more satisfied, but he believed there was a management–staff split. Further, C0 was confused, in his mind, with a trade body, because of a cross-over of personnel. Despite his close contact with C0, he did not know of the diversification, and, in fact, he thought that C0 was lacking in acquiring new competencies.

Fortunately, C0 had numerous saving graces. Management were very clear about diversification and there was evidence that the introduction of new practices was successful. Even though one client attacked C0's management–staff split, internal interviews showed that the managing director maintained an open-door policy.

With the research, it does seem that C0's healthy sales need to be taken with a grain of salt. Whether the company will post similarly healthy figures for 1999 remains to be seen.

The question of term emerges. B2's branding programme was only beginning at the time of the research, so negative impressions may still exist publicly. Co, meanwhile, had had a major push into new areas, and its positive impressions may be keeping its sales buoyant for the time being.

C1 Insecure goodwill

C1 HAD an eventful decade. It purchased C1A, and then it was acquired by C1B. In spite of the changes, the C1 brand remained.

The company, in the security industry, did not have time to settle. A new strategy of a "systems' approach" was introduced. The C1 identity was to be extended across all divisions (including C1A) as a result—but that was more a management diktat, rather than an issue for staff consultation. Even a C1 manager admitted that if I were to approach another division, I would receive a different answer regarding the company's direction and purpose.

The same manager also stated that C1 stood for different things to different audiences, and no effort had been made in explaining company values internally. Strategic information was kept confidential, even from staff.

But C1 got some aspects right. The central firm's stationery, corporate advertising and other items showed consistency nationally. An identity manual existed. Yet its newer businesses had not changed completely, and there was also an admission within that there was no 'structured mechanism' for identity.

Externally, an insurance assessor felt there was a lack of information from C1. However, a customer was highly complimentary, basing his judgement on C1's 'reputation for quality [and] reliability.'

Past glories sustain, our logic tells us, organizations for a short time. Few understood C1's systems' approach. In addition, C1 was strong in its core areas and not in its new markets. While some external audiences in the security industry or its contractors understood many aspects of C1 through their contact, its customers relied solely on existing images.

Business performance figures were insufficient but what I did get gave a slightly unhealthy picture as the existing image waned.

C2 Publishers and publicans

IF THERE WAS an award for frankness and openness, C2's managing director would win it. He inherited an unhealthy company and recognized the problems within. While there were steps being taken to rectify C2's position, they would not see the light of day during the study.

Thus, the company was grouped at the bottom, which the MD accepted.

He recognized that the identity had come to the end of its life in 1998. There were signs, on my visit, that a "textbook" approach to identity—one that had served A2 so well—was being employed. The moves were being welcomed by employees. So C2 was an unusual subject, where I had to separate what had been done for the previous identity and what was being done for its successor.

C2 was highly fragmented. 'There was no corporate umbrella and no corporate branding,' said the MD. It faced an even greater task with its brand name: no one ever referred to a C2 publication as 'C2's book' but by the name of its author(s), or, in one circumstance, 'the purple book'. Even titles were rarely used.

The managing director decided to sort out human resources and communications, setting up committees. These were cross-functional, and well received by staff participating in this study. There were signs they worked: some of C2's less productive employees had been dismissed. Friday night drinks at a local pub had been introduced, even if the MD felt he had not attended enough of them—but believed 1999 would be about him "walking the talk".

However, the identity remained confused. The vision statement was unadventurous (and sounded like a competitor's), and there was uncertainty over how the other businesses were incorporated into C2. The existing, inadequate branding remained.

It was no surprise to learn that customers felt unsure about C2. One thought C2 was ignorant of customer requirements and bought books in her area regardless of publisher. There was no brand loyalty. Another had 'trouble remembering which [books] are theirs and which aren't.' Thus, there was nothing to differentiate C2.

Yet C2 was not unhealthy. One reason was lacklustre competi-

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tion—something which did not apply at the other successful companies.

It had strengths in the core-market acceptance of its products, and in its digital publications, which increased revenue. The core markets, said the MD, were extremely stable and averse to change. Again, the issue of term had been tapped into: what would happen if C2 did not get its act together? How long would it take the core market to find out?

As C2 revamps its identity, the questions became academic. One should expect to see, as it properly manages the way it expresses itself, greater improvements in performance.

The analysis

A2 WAS the model company, although its identity focuses on the present. There was also no vision statement meeting the requirements of the literature, A2 preferring to rely on a catchy slogan. In this study, the vision statement was found to be unnecessary *when it is substituted by a realistic and representative slogan that is used as the unifying philosophy*. A2 illustrated this admirably.

But what of its focus on the present? Only a longitudinal study will properly answer that, but there was not enough evidence to reject the necessity of including long-term planning in identity development. A2's saving grace may be its continual feedback procedures and fine-tuning, which a smaller organization would surely lack.

The Bs had commitment to identity but did not manage to communicate that to every audience. In B1's case, the general manager had to see to internal needs first before addressing branding in 1998; B2 had a strong reputation with some shortcomings. Both organizations, however, could improve (as both were beginning to do at the time of the research) by identifying and reaching all audiences consistently, replacing any negative existing images with positive ones.

With the Bs, there is the issue of audiences holding existing images. An entire study could be devoted to this alone: how long does it take for audience groups to forget any negative images as a new identity programme comes on stream? Politicians, in particular, could do well in knowing when *faux pas* depart from the collective consciousness. The British Conservative Party, noted for sleaze in the mid-'90s, is regaining a positive reputation as dissatisfaction with the current government grows—and a similar amount of sleaze, which Tony Blair had once promised to eliminate from Labour, is exposed. John Major was criticized heavily by one of the Dimbleby brothers in a 1997 interview; this was very different to the good-natured chat hosted by Tim Sebastian—never mind that the programme was called *Hard Talk*—in 1999.

Media are tolerant of new governments and their indiscretions for only so long, and the pair of rose-coloured glasses is tempting to don.

The outpouring of grief for the sudden death of Diana, Princess of Wales, and the public criticisms of HRH Prince Charles (some of which were published in *CAP* in our Letters to the Editor in September 1997) has since become positive press for the Prince, as the father of the future King, and the popular figure of the Royal Family.

As Finland moves from being a primary products' nation to the most wired country on earth, and the origin of the Nokia brand, its existing image in the "global consciousness" is gradually changing.

These are very obvious, internationally known examples which apply equally to the corporate image.

Cs placed no emphasis on identity at all. Unfortunately, C0 failed to unite its internal audiences and entered into new markets without proper consideration of its standing, marketing, or, it appears, quality of employees. C0 and C1 were top–down in their approaches; C2 hands-off. C1 was complacent, resting on its laurels. At least C2, despite having ample laurels, realized that gaining new ones would not go amiss, even if this was only beginning at the time of the research. But all had strong past reputations and positive existing images—highlighting a possible danger of complacency.

In these circumstances, brand extensions would require more investment and, in the companies studied, there was a high threat of entry from competitors.

Therefore, they need to make a rigorous effort to remove the negative impressions from its audiences, and to rebuild their identities. There is no easy way to do this, as C2's managing director has found, than to return to basics and form a cross-functional working group to do research, and to examine the long-term strategy. The task is made more daunting by the thought that research alone could take anywhere from a year to two years, and implementation, depending on the budget, a year to several years after that. However, it is an investment for the future.

Other elements

THE THEORY is proven now, and it is tempting to leave it there. However, other factors of the model need to be considered briefly.

In identity, it's vital to have complete management commitment. While this summary does not focus on this, it was covered in some detail in the resulting thesis. The companies who did well had this as a foundation, and C2's MD seems to fit the role admirably, heralding a successful start to the twenty-first century.

Management needs to be facilitative, too. B organizations ranked as "good" in this area, while A2 was given an "excellent" rating, based on questionnaire and interview responses. The facilitation impacts on the exposition of the identity, including the period leading up to launch.

Finally, there needs to be interdepartmental connectedness. A2 had little problem there, with everyone from executives to frontline staff understanding the corporate philosophy. This varied in the B group but was poor amongst the Cs. Interdepartmental connectedness impacts less on research but is vital to the other stages.

Implications

LARGE ORGANIZATIONS can use identity as a catalyst in change management. It can be a useful and practical framework to move an organization toward a market orientation model. People tend to be

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site, then your customers are going to think twice about dealing with you. One of my friends collects free email accounts like some people collect stamps. Over-70s read *CAP* and *Lucire*, and they have email accounts to correspond with grand-children or conduct business.

Conduct business? Why not? Why should age matter? We have an awful habit of tying success to age, but we may be that lucky generation which comes to realize that the wisdom that comes with experience is important. For we now get advice and analyse it on its merits in email. We often never see the writer. We don't know the age, the colour, the race, or creed.

This electronic removal of some of the factors which might spark prejudice must be the greatest development of the 1990s. Anonymity is a small price to pay for a medium through which one can be judged on one's merits.

When JY&A started in 1987, we were very young, and we faced ageism. This was the major reason we began working offshore, and to this day, we remain better known as a "foreign" firm.

Today's visionaries have it easier. If credibility is measured by merit in the online medium, we have cause to be optimistic. With an increasingly less objective mass media, a weaker Constitution that had to survive an impeachment trial, Whitehall caring more about buzzwords than policies, and a general misunderstanding of the meanings of *ethics, honour, patriotism, public interest* and *duty*, there is, sometimes, reason to place more faith in the virtual world than in the real one. • Jack Yan

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sceptical about changes if they do not see how it relates to the organization's performance; the identity model recommends keeping internal audiences informed.

Identity can be used to ensure consistency, and more importantly, to create a sense of anticipation and ownership internally. In one company's case, old images were speedily replaced because the identity had been positively launched both internally and externally.

It can also be used to ensure that the organization is performing well. All audiences can be surveyed to check their perceptions of an organization and its rivals. An organization can discover how well it is differentiating itself.

New businesses can use identity to get things right first time. In the 2000s when businesses can be founded in mere weeks and brought together by a web site, identity can be used to establish visibility and communicate a vision to audiences. The need to unite people behind a single vision becomes more relevant, even for a small business, when it comes to managing perceptions on a worldwide basis.

Identity must be ongoing to be successful. Wally's use of 'explicit management' in his definition says as much. Resources need to be put toward identity, just as they are for any other information or financial system. It is a vital business and management resource that should never be ignored. The good news is that today, organizations have the research to justify spending in identity. • Jack Yan

Author's note: The use of the Lloyds Bank PLC symbol in the photographs is strictly illustrative. Lloyds Bank PLC did not participate in this study.

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brought him into contact with the most sought-after models of the period including Twiggy, Grace Coddington and Nicole de Lamage, and he worked extensively with Twiggy in the early stages of her career.

These images include many classic shots, rarely seen before, which characterize one of the most fascinating eras of recent history. • Simone Knol

At the Canon Photography Gallery at the V&A, September 16, 1999 to January 30, 2000.

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Typographer's note
The typeface used for the headline in 'Trading Identities' is a custom design, JY Berlinetta Bold, by JY&A Fonts for a private account and not available for sale. There are also no plans for making it available unless there is demand, upon which the entire family could be developed. It will make its first appearance online this year. It is essentially a millennial reinterpretation of ITC Officina, created with the brief 'If ITC Officina was for the late '80s and Meta for the '90s, then how might Erik Spiekermann approach a typeface of the '00s?' (with apologies to Erik).